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MARK  V.  TUSHNET*
Bradley Canon, a political scientist, has identified more than ten
meanings  of the terms "judicial activism"  and "judicial restraint."'
Under the circumstances  it is hardly surprising that I have little orig-
inal  to  add  to  the  discussion.  Indeed, my  lack  of originality  is  so
great  that this Comment  is primarily an elaboration of some points
touched on in passing in Professor Cox's more wide-ranging  article.
Nonetheless,  it may help to restate  them in my own way.
My  basic  theme  is  that  the concepts  of activism  and  restraint
are, in  themselves,  quite unhelpful  because  they refer  to too  many
things.  I  will identify  five different  meanings  of activism  and show
that they are independent  of each  other.  Thus, when  someone  de-
scribes  a  decision  or  a judge  as  activist,  we  have  to  know  which
meaning  is intended.  Yet, once we  identify the precise meaning  at
issue, we can discuss  the merits of the underlying claim without us-
ing the terms activism or restraint.  As we will see, however, there is
a sixth meaning of the concepts which is not entirely independent  of
the prior ones.  Even that final meaning, though, does not make the
concepts  very  interesting.
The  first  meaning  of  judicial  activism  is  technical.  The
Supreme Court is supposed  to decide only real  cases; it is not sup-
posed  to  give  advice  to  people  who  simply  would  like  to  know
whether some law is constitutional or not.  According  to this  defini-
tion of activism,  the Court should therefore decide  cases only when
its decision will actually affect people's legal rights.  Consider, then,
some examples.  The Price-Anderson  Act2  is a federal  law about in-
surance for disasters  at nuclear power plants.  Under  the Price-An-
derson Act, if a disaster occurs at a nuclear power plant,  the entire
industry helps pay for the damages, but only up to a specified  and,
according  to  most  analysts,  still  rather  low  limit,  despite  recent
amendments. Opponents  of nuclear power brought a  suit claiming
that  the  Price-Anderson  Act  was  unconstitutional  because  if a  nu-
clear disaster  occurred  and  damages  exceeded  the statutory  limit,
*  Professor  of Law,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center.  A.B.,  Harvard  College,
1967; M.A.,  Yale  University,  1971;J.D.,  Yale  Law  School,  1971.
1.  See Canon, A  Framework  for the Analysis offJudicial Activism,  in  SUPREME  COURT Ac-
TIVISM  AND  RESTRAINT  (S.  Halpern  & C.  Lamb ed.  1982).
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people who  lived  near the plant would bear uncompensated  losses
while the rest of us got the benefit  of nuclear power.3  This  might
seem  to be a request for an advisory  opinion because the Price-An-
derson limit  has never been exceeded  in any nuclear disaster.  The
Court reached  the merits of the constitutional challenge anyway.4  It
found that there was  a real and present controversy between people
who lived  near the site of a proposed  nuclear plant and the power
company.  The residents would be injured not by a nuclear disaster,
which might  never occur, but by the fact  that the  plant would  dis-
charge  heated  water  into  a nearby  lake,  thus making  the lake  less
suitable for recreation.  And Price-Anderson would cause this injury
because the power company would not build the plant unless it were
sure that its liability for future disasters would  be limited.  It seems
fair to  describe the Court's decision  to reach the merits of the con-
stitutional  challenge  as  activist  according  to  the  first  meaning  of
activism.
Another example of activism in this sense comes from the area
of criminal law.  Many state constitutions have provisions quite simi-
lar  to  those  in  the  federal  constitution.  Sometimes  a  defendant
claims that evidence found in a search should be excluded from trial
because  the search was unconstitutional.  If the search  is found un-
constitutional  under  state law,  the Supreme Court  cannot  do any-
thing about the decision  to exclude the evidence because  it has the
power  to  review  only decisions  based  on federal  law.  What  if the
state court says  that it is excluding the evidence because the search
violated  both  the state  and  the  federal constitutions?  A  Supreme
Court decision  saying that the state court was wrong about the fed-
eral  constitution  would be  an  advisory  opinion,  because  the  state
court would still exclude the evidence based on its interpretation  of
state  law. Sometimes, though,  state courts  do not make it clear that
they are relying on their state constitutions, especially when the lan-
guage of the two constitutions is similar.  A court interested in judi-
cial restraint would resolve these ambiguities by refusing to hear the
cases,  thus avoiding  the risk  of rendering  an advisory  opinion.  In
1983  the  Supreme  Court  moved  in  the  other,  activist  direction,
adopting the rule that it would assume that ambiguous  decisions re-
lied  on the federal constitution.5
Here  we should  note two things.  The Price-Anderson  opinion
was written  by Chief Justice Burger, and the state constitution deci-
3.  See  Duke Power Co.  v. Carolina  Envtl. Study Group,  Inc., 438  U.S.  59  (1978).
4.  Id. at 82.
5.  See  Michigan  v. Long, 463  U.S.  1032  (1983).
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sion  was  written  by Justice  O'Connor.  This  first  type  of activism,
then, is not the same as "liberalism,"  as we usually think of it.  Sec-
ond,  I have not yet described  the Court's decisions on the merits in
these cases,  and when I do you will see why  there are other mean-
ings of activism.  The Court upheld the Price-Anderson  Act;6  it also
held  that  the  criminal  evidence  at issue  should  not have  been  ex-
cluded.7  In both cases the Court did  not overturn  the decisions  of
democratically  elected or responsible  decisionmakers.
The  second  meaning  of activism  is  also  somewhat  technical,
although  it begins to move in a more substantive  direction.  Profes-
sor Cox alludes  to it in his discussion of the propriety  of and limits
upon overruling  prior Supreme  Court  decisions.  According  to the
second meaning of activism, a court is  activist if it readily  overturns
precedents,  at  least  without  severe problems  having  arisen  in  the
administration of the rule derived from the precedent.  At the end of
its  most  recent  term,  the  Court demonstrated  its  activism  in  this
sense  by overruling  three cases,  two decided  in the  1960s  and one
handed down in 1860.8 Yet the present Court cannot be regarded as
completely activist in this sense; on at least two recent occasions,  the
Court adhered  to precedents  that at least some  of its members  re-
garded as not very well reasoned.'  Once again,  we should consider
the proposition  that  activism  in this  second  sense  is  not the  same
thing as  "conservatism,"  as Professor  Cox  has  stressed.  Were  the
Court to overrule Roe v.  Wade,' 0  for example,  it would be activist in
this sense and conservative  in political  terms.
The third  meaning of judicial  activism  is  linked  to the idea  of
democracy.  An  activist  decision  substitutes  the  judgment  of
unelected judges  for those of elected  decisionmakers.  Again,  con-
sider some examples.  A city school board, an elected  body, negoti-
ated a contract with a teachers'  union, itself an internally democratic
body.  Among other provisions,  the contract dealt with layoffs in the
face of fiscal  stringency or declining enrollments.  The layoff provi-
6.  Duke Power, 438 U.S. at  85.
7.  Long, 463  U.S.  at  1051.
8.  See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways,  107 S. Ct. 2941  (1987)  (overruling Parden
v.  Terminal  Ry.,  377 U.S.  184 (1964));  Solorio v.  United States,  107  S.  Ct.  2924  (1987)
(overruling O'Callahan  v.  Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969));  Puerto Rico v.  Branstad,  107  S.
Ct. 2802  (1987)  (overruling  Kentucky  v.  Dennison, 65  U.S.  (24 How.)  66  (1860)).
9.  See  Vasquez  v.  Hillery,  474  U.S.  254  (1985)  (reversing  conviction  of defendant
indicted  by grand jury selected  in racially  discriminating manner); Miller  v.  Fenton, 474
U.S.  104  (1985)  (holding that federal  court in habeas  corpus proceeding may indepen-
dently  determine  voluntariness  of confession).
10.  410  U.S.  113  (1973).
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sion had an affirmative action element, according to which the usual
principle of seniority-"first hired, last fired"-was tempered by an
effort  to  maintain  the  positions  of more  recently  hired  minority
teachers.  It should be noted, too, that whites  were a majority in the
city and in the teachers'  union.  Disgruntled white teachers, who had
been  unable  to persuade or muster enough  political  clout to influ-
ence  either the  school board  or their union,  turned  to  the  federal
courts."  The Supreme  Court's  decision  invalidating  the  contract
freely negotiated  between  two democratically  responsible bodies  is
activist  in this third sense.
Another  example of judicial  activism  is  provided by a more re-
cent  case.  California's  voters  have  created  a  Coastal Commission
whose goal is  to protect the coastline.  One  way  it does so  is by re-
quiring that people with homes on the coast  obtain permits  for any
home  alterations.  The  Commission  can  impose  conditions  on  the
permits-for  example,  it can  specify  that a  home  addition be built
according  to  certain methods  that minimize  the risk of beach  ero-
sion.  In  a case  recently  decided by the Supreme  Court, homeown-
ers  wanted  to replace  their beach  bungalow  with a  larger  house.'
2
The  Commission  required  the homeowners,  as a  condition  of ob-
taining the required building permit, to provide public access to the
beach  in  front  of their house.  The homeowners  claimed  that  the
Commission  was "taking"  their property-the right to exclusive  use
of the beach-without  compensating  them as required  by the  Con-
stitution.  The Court's  decision  in  favor of the homeowners' 3  was
activist in the third sense, overturning a decision by a democratically
responsible  body.
Once  again  we  see  that  there  is  no  necessary  connection  be-
tween conservatism and restraint in this third sense.  Perhaps more
important, though, is that calling a decision activist because it over-
turns a decision made by a democratic body is simply saying that the
decision  is  an application of the Constitution, at least so long as  we
think  that judicial  review  is  part of the Constitution.  After  all,  we
would  not  have judicial  review  if we  thought  that  majority  deci-
sionmakers  would  always  comply  with  the Constitution.' 4  We  can
I1.  Wygant v. Jackson Bd.  of Educ.,  476 U.S.  267  (1986).
12.  Nollan v. California Coastal  Comm'n,  107  S.  Ct.  3141  (1987).
13.  Id. at  3150.
14.  This observation undermines  the force of Professor Morgan's  effort to character-
ize judicial  review as  the enforcement  of a  bargain  we made with  ourselves.  After  all,
"we"-that  is,  those  of us  living today-did  not enter into the bargain  in any  explicit
way;  the bargain  was  made  in  1787  and  1868 among  people  not all of whom  are in  a
useful sense predecessors  in interest to many of us today.  Therefore, binding  us today
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move  to the fourth meaning of activism  to see  how activism  is con-
nected  to  the idea of constitutionalism.  Proponents  of judicial re-
straint might defend the affirmative action and beachhome decisions
by saying that the Court can overturn decisions  made by democrati-
cally  responsible  bodies,  but  only  when  the democratic  body  has
contravened the clear intent of the drafters of the Constitution. The
fourth meaning ofjudicial activism,  then, is that an activist decision
invalidates  a statute on some  ground other than that  it violates  the
intent of the framers.
On this  occasion  I do not want  to enter into the  debate about
the jurisprudence  of "original  intention."  Rather,  I  again  want  to
illustrate the  fourth meaning of judicial  activism, here by using ex-
amples  of judges  or  decisions  that  are  restrained according  to  this
meaning.  A generation ago Justice Hugo Black was the leading pro-
ponent  of judicial  restraint in  this sense.  Black contended  that  the
framers  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  intended  that  the  states
would thereafter have to comply with the requirements of the Bill of
Rights, and cited speeches  in the House and Senate  by the amend-
ment's primary  sponsors  saying exactly  that.'5  He argued  that  the
establishment  clause  of the first amendment  rather severely limited
the permissible official  interactions  between  church and state, rely-
ing on arguments  developed by James Madison,  the primary author
of the  establishment  clause,  in  the course  of his  ten-year effort  to
have Virginia adopt its Statute on Religious Liberty. 16  More recent
conservative  critics of Black have shown that it is necessary  to qual-
ify  Black's  historical  arguments  around  the  edges,  but  his  funda-
mental  points remain unimpaired.
Justice Black was  a straightforward liberal originalist. More sub-
tle is the originalism of Louis Brandeis, who relied on his interpreta-
tion of the framers'  basic theory of the relation between government
and citizen to state his-and to Brandeis, the framers'-understand-
ing of free speech in an eloquent opinion in 1927.' 7  Note the open-
ing words  of each  sentence  in  the  opinion's  core  passage:  "Those
who won our independence believed  ....  They  valued liberty  .... They
believed  liberty  .... They  believed  that freedom  .... They  recog-
nized the risks ....  But they knew ....  [and finally]  Believing in the
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed
to  the bargain  that they  struck  then requires  some justification independent  of the  ra-
tionale that  bargains  should be enforced.
15.  See  Adamson  v. California, 332  U.S. 46, 68-123  (1947)  (Black, J., dissenting).
16.  See  Everson v. Board  of Educ.,  330  U.S.  1 (1947).
17.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.  357, 375-76 (1927)  (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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silence coerced  by law-the argument of force in its worst form."'"
By examining  the framers'  general  theories  of government, Justice
Brandeis,  like  later  originalists,  could  use  a  theory  of judicial  re-
straint in  the fourth  sense  to  limit  decisions  made  by  democratic
processes, thus promoting judicial  activism  in  the third  sense.
It is  a matter of some controversy among  scholars  of constitu-
tional  law  how  far one can  go  with  this  sort of originalism.  Some
have defended the Court's death penalty decisions by invoking their
reconstruction  of the framers'  theory of government.' 9  Others are
troubled  by  such  arguments  but  have  difficulty  explaining  why
something like  wiretapping, which  the framers  could  not have  con-
templated, ought  to be regulated  by the Constitution.  Every  argu-
ment that brings wiretapping  in opens the way  to the much broader
arguments  I have mentioned.  The fourth meaning of judicial  activ-
ism (and restraint), which limits the concepts  to the jurisprudence of
original intention,  is therefore less  useful  than the preceding  three
meanings,  because it  does not really point  to any  identifiable  phe-
nomenon in  the behavior of courts.20
The  fifth  meaning  of activism  derives  from  the  citizen's  per-
spective on the government. 2'  From the citizen's point of view what
matters  most is  how his or her life is  constrained  by government.2 2
The organ  or branch  of government  imposing  such  constraints  is
much less important to the citizen than the scope of the constraints.
According  to  the fifth  meaning  of activism,  we  should  look at  the
activity of the government  as a whole:  an activist court is an arm of
an activist government.  For example, the Court in the 1940s was an
activist court with respect to economic matters, because it endorsed
the actions  of the New  Deal in  imposing governmental  constraints
on private economic  activity.  A more recent example ofjudicial ac-
tivism  in  this  sense  of supporting  an  activist  government  is  the
Supreme  Court's  decision  in  Bowers  v.  Hardwick 21  upholding  state
18.  Id. (emphasis  added).
19.  See,  e.g.,  Richards,  Book Review,  71  CAL. L.  REV.  1372 (1983).
20.  It  might  be  useful  in  those  occasional  cases  when judges  fail  even  to  invoke
originalist  arguments.  The standards  of the practice of writing  opinions,  however,  al-
most invariably  lead judges to include such invocations.  See Fallon, A Constructivist Coher-
ence  Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100  HARV.  L.  REV.  1189,  1244  (1987).
2 1.  This meaning is  also related to some arguments  by political  scientists  about the
place of courts in a  government.  See M.  SHAPIRO,  COURTS:  A  COMPARATIVE  AND  POLIT-
ICAL  ANALYSIS  (1981).
22.  See  Seidman,  ABSCAM  and  the  Constitution, 83  MICH.  L.  REV.  1199,  1204-07
(1985).
23.  106 S. Ct. 2841  (1986).  One might somewhat  more controversially  characterize
the Court's  general  position on  criminal  procedure as activist  in  this sense.  Certainly,
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laws against private consensual sodomy.  Conversely,  an example of
judicial  restraint  in  this  fifth  sense,  that  is,  of judicial  limitations
placed on governmental  regulation of private  life,  would of course
be the abortion  cases  in  the Supreme  Court.24
Once  again  this  collection  of examples  shows  that  activism  is
not necessarily  related  to  conventional  "conservative"  or "liberal"
labels.  In this fifth  sense the sodomy  decision  was activist and con-
servative, the New Deal cases were activist and liberal, and the abor-
tion  decisions were restrained  and  liberal. Similarly,  I have  argued
that none of the meanings of activism or restraint has any systematic
relation to conventional  political  labels or indeed  to anything else.
What then  is  the function  of these concepts?
Here  I  turn to  the sixth and final  meaning of activism  and re-
straint.  They are what philosophers have called "praise  words"  and
"blame  words."  Given  an  extended  discussion  of the  courts  in
which  the sentence  "This  was an activist decision"  appears,  we  can
translate the sentence, knowing its context,  as "I  approve (or disap-
prove)  of the decision."  Similarly,  if the sentence  is  "I  disapprove
of this  decision because  it exemplifies judicial  activism,"  we  know
nothing more after hearing the second half of the sentence than we
did after hearing the first half.
We  offer praise and blame according  to some underlying theo-
ries, of course, and we might choose to capture those theories with a
single word or phrase like activism or restraint. Yet when  that same
word or phrase is used to summarize different underlying theories-
for  example,  majoritarianism  (the third  meaning  I  discussed)  and
originalism (the fourth meaning)-the likely result is confusion.  For
almost a generation  legal scholars of constitutional law have argued
that it was  unhelpful to talk about the courts using the terms  activ-
ism and restraint. The ambiguity of the implied reference  to under-
lying theories  explains why.
This  might  suggest  the conclusion  that the  terms  ought  to be
abandoned.  There  is,  however,  one  final  observation  that  seems
worth making.  I have called  activism and restraint praise and blame
words.  If  we  look  at  the  actual  rhetoric  of discussions  of  the
Supreme Court, we see that they are not equally so. Sometimes  peo-
ple mean  to praise a decision  by calling  it activist, but usually activ-
the Court's  overall enthusiasm  for intrusive  methods  of crime  detection  and  investiga-
tion seems  activist,  yet it seems hard  to defend a posture  of governmental  restraint  per
se in  the detection and investigation  of crime.
24.  See,  e.g.,  Roe v. Wade,  410 U.S.  113 (1973);  Thornburgh v. American  College of
Obstetricians,  106  S.  Ct.  2169  (1986).
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ism  is  a  blame word,  and  conversely  with  restraint.  I  suspect  that
activism  tends  to be  a  blame word for relatively deep  cultural rea-
sons,  primarily because  of the fourth-"activist state"-meaning  of
activism.  Everyone  knows  that,  looked  at  over  the  long  run,  our
government has  become  increasingly  activist, and almost everyone
is a little uneasy about that development.  Activism as a blame word
captures  that unease.  (Consider how  it would  sound  if we  started
talking  about  "judicial  energy"  and  "judicial  lassitude.")  Yet  we
also know that there is very little we can do to halt the rise of activist
government,  so we  cannot  let activism  become  a blame word  alto-
gether.  The  ambiguities  of the  idea of judicial  activism  let people
express  their  unease  about  activist  government.  In  the  first  in-
stance,  it  directs  the  criticism  at  the  courts,  an  institution  that  is
quite unimportant in the overall development of the activist  state.25
And in  the last instance, it allows people to  say that they are uneasy
about activist government without doing much about it.  In the end,
I suspect, the concept of  judicial activism is the last, relatively trivial
bastion  of conservative  opposition  to the modern  state.
25.  For example, the courts have had essentially nothing to say about national secur-
ity policy, the  size of the budget--even  (for the most part) its allocation between domes-
tic and military expenditures-tax policy, and the like.
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